Discussion: "Credit Crunches and the Great Stagflation" by Drechsler-Savov-Schnabl

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Summary: Credit Crunches and the Great Stagflation

Idea: Regulation-Q caused 1966-1982 stagflation

- Fed's deposit rate ceilings (Reg-Q) became binding
- Outflow of core deposits caused credit crunch
- Credit crunch increased fin. costs (e.g., cost push a la Barth-Ramey-01)
- Firms raised prices (inflation) and cut output (recession)

Evidence:


- 1. Aggregate time series
- 2. XS: manufacturing sectors (4-digit SIC) & years
 - A: credit crunch ≈ agg. deposit flow crunch exposure ≈ Fin. dependence ≈ F(profit margin) sector level
 B: credit crunch ≈ spread = FFR - deposit rate
 - crunch exposure \approx county level reg-Q exposure agg. to sector level

Discussion:

- XS-to-macro?
- What drives the XS?

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Req-Q period & Stagflation



Cross-sectional Fact 1: Binding Req-Q Period: 1966-1982

Data: historical agg. FDIC & NBER CES Manufacturing

 $\Delta y_{i,t} = \gamma_i + \alpha_t + \beta \Delta D_t \times FinDep_i + \theta X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$

Cross-sectional Fact 1: Binding Req-Q Period: 1966-1982

Data: historical agg. FDIC & NBER CES Manufacturing

	Δ Price		ΔΟι	utput
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta \operatorname{Dep}_t \times \operatorname{Fin.} \operatorname{Dep}_i$	-0.24 (-2.74)	-0.29 (-3.15)	0.63 (2.82)	0.57 (2.60)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R ² N	0.55 7,344	0.55 7,344	0.19 7,344	0.19 7,344

 $\Delta y_{i,t} = \gamma_i + \alpha_t + \beta \Delta D_t \times \textit{FinDep}_i + \theta X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$


Aggregate fact consistent with micro-evidence

Around 0.9% relative price increase and 1.7% relative output loss for more fin. dependent manufacturing industries for 15 pp deposit growth drop

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Discussion: DSS Stagflati

Post-Regulation-Q: No Stagflation



- No stagflation
- Large deposit swings

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Cross-sectional Fact 2: 1982-1998 No Reg-Q

$\Delta y_{i,t} = \gamma_i + \alpha_t + \beta \Delta D_t \times \textit{FinDep}_i + \theta X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$	Δ Price		Δ Output	
Data: FDIC & NBER CES Manufacturing	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta \operatorname{Dep}_t \times \operatorname{Fin.} \operatorname{Dep}_i$	-0.31 (-5.53)	-0.33 (-6.34)	0.22 (1.78)	0.23 (1.97)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted <i>R</i> ² <i>N</i>	0.32 7,784	0.33 7,784	0.06 7,784	0.07 7,784

Same XS-fact:

Fin.dep. sectors raise prices & cut output as core deposits fall

Different macro-fact: no stagflation

Micro-Macro-Disconnect? Or why could Reg-Q mechanism fail to explain stagflation?

- A. XS-fact explained by Reg-Q mechanism
 - But manufacturing sector relatively small
 - But countervailing general equilibrium effects, e.g., Δ relative prices accelerate secular shift to services, more outsourcing, Δ entry / exits
- B. XS-fact not explained by Reg-Q mechanism
 - Reg-Q-induced credit-crunch story?

A: micro-fact may $\not\rightarrow$ macro-fact

Large literature uses micro-estimates to understand policy responses

(e.g., Auclert-Dobbie-Goldsmith-Pinkham-19, Mian-Sufi-09, Parker-Souleles-Johnson-McClelland-13, Zwick-Mahon-17)

• Want agg. response y to shock " ε_t " (e.g., credit crunch)

$$\hat{y}_t = \underbrace{\hat{y}_{i,t}^{PE}}_{PE} + \underbrace{\hat{y}_{g,t}}_{GE}$$

Causal micro-estimates


$$y_{i,t} = \gamma_i + \alpha_t + \beta \times \varepsilon_{i,t} + u_{i,t}$$

recover $\hat{\beta} = \hat{y}_{i,t}^{PE}$ assuming $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ and ε_t imply symmetric effects

- Problem: possible GE effects soaked up by α_t time FE α_t is "The Missing Intercept" (Wolf-21 studies stimulus checks)
- Typical solution involves some structure
 - e.g., Kaplan-Violante-18, von Lehm-Winberry-21, Winberry-21, Wolf-21

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A: Why XS fact may not aggregate



- 1. Small declining nominal GDP share
- 2. Even smaller but stable real GDP share
- 3. Prices in manufacturing grew less than in other sectors

A: Financial Dependence and GDP Shares - all sectors

- Data: BEA (SIC 2-digit)
- Output shares of ex-gov N.GDP

	FinDep	< 66	66-70	71-75	76-81	>= 82
manufacturing		30%	29%	26%	25%	20%
services+trade		37%	38%	40%	41%	46%
other		33%	33%	34%	34%	34%

But services + trade likely higher relative price growth

 \Rightarrow For mechanism to aggregate, need it stronger in services

A: Financial Dependence and GDP Shares - all sectors

Data: BEA (SIC 2-digit)

• Calculate "fin-dep" = $2 - \frac{Sales}{Costs}$ using sales & input costs

	FinDep	< 66	66-70	71-75	76-81	>= 82
manufacturing	High=0.54	30%	29%	26%	25%	20%
services+trade	Low=0.12	37%	38%	40%	41%	46%
other		33%	33%	34%	34%	34%

- Service + trade less "fin-dep" than manufacturing
- Mechanism: \Rightarrow service sectors should have raised prices less
- But services + trade likely higher relative price growth

A: Changing Composition of Manufacturing Sectors

- ▶ 66-82: 6 least fin-dep. sectors gain 5% output share
- ▶ 66-82: 6 most fin-dep. sectors loose 6% output share

Industry Examples	FinDep	< 66	81-85
Chemical & Pharma Electronics Machinery	Low	8% 4% 15%	10% 4% 20%
 Transportation Primary Metal Industries Textile Mill Products	High	17% 8% 3%	14% 5% 2%

- More entrants in low fin-dependent sectors Foster-Haltiwanger-Syverson 2008: entrants charge lower prices
- Akin to SUTVA violation or missing intercept problem
 - Price/output differences partially driven by less fin.dep sectors (more entrants) lowering prices higher sales

B: XS-fact due to Reg-Q induced credit crunch?

- Data: $Corr(\Delta Core D_t, \Delta Total L_t) > 0$
- Mechanism: less business lending \Rightarrow higher prices & lower output

1966-1982

 Δ Price Δ Output

B: XS-fact due to Reg-Q induced credit crunch?

• Mechanism: less business lending \Rightarrow higher prices & lower output

	Data:	credit boom/	more lending \Rightarrow	higher	prices &	2 lower output
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1966-1982	Δ Price	$\Delta Output$
Δ Real Business Loans _t × Fin. Dep _i	0.25 (2.43)	-0.73 (-5.02)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes
Industry FE	Yes	Yes
Adjusted <i>R</i> ² <i>N</i>	0.55 7,344	0.20 7,344

How to reconcile with XS fact around deposit growth?

 $Corr(\Delta Core D_t, \Delta Business L_t) = -0.63$

B: XS-fact due to Reg-Q induced credit crunch?

1966-1982	Δ Price	$\Delta Output$
Δ Real Business Loans _t × Fin. Dep _i	0.25 (2.43)	-0.73 (-5.02)
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► Times are bad ⇒ two independent effects


• Fed \uparrow *FFR* $\Rightarrow \Delta Core D_t \downarrow$

Firms draw down credit lines ⇒ ΔBusiness L_t ↑ banks fund using market rate (does not yet explain intact)

So maybe no credit crunch story - or just hard to detect at industry level


B: Alternative Explanation for XS-fact

- FinDep: Constant F(Profit Margin):
- "More financially constrained" \approx low-profit-margin industries \approx Liquidity constrained (higher Op-leverage) pre-1966 Compustat data



B: Alternative Explanation for XS-fact

 Gilchrist-Schoenle-Sim-Zakrajšek-17: liquidity constrained firms increase prices & have low sales after neg. demand shock to preserve internal liquidity Panel A. By liquidity ratio



 Relies on financial friction but not Reg-Q induced bank-credit crunch Would explain why micro-fact remains present post Reg-Q

Suggestions to sharpen Reg-Q-mechanism

- Identification at industry level close to impossible Disaggregated data to nail Req-Q mechanism
 - US Census data for 1963, 1967, and 1972– present
 - Study banks' stock return reaction to ceiling removals in 1970, 1973, and 1978 – if banks were constrained from making profitable NPV investments relaxation of constrained, expect positive abnormal returns
 - Compustat not super populated but still stgh to learn from?
- Across state variation in intrastate branch restriction to validate Reg-Q exposure measure (stronger in states with restrictions)
- Reg-Q exposure: still might load up on regions with industries in decline, can you show this is not the case
- Why focus on manufacturing alone (BEA data even if just at 2 digits)
- International: UK coined "stagflation" in 1965; no deposit rate ceiling, so what's the reason there. Iain Macleod's 65 speech to Parliament:

"We now have the worst of both worlds—not just inflation on the one side or stagnation on the other, but both of them together. We have a sort of 'stagflation' situation. And history, in modern terms, is indeed being made."

Conclusion

- Compelling narrative of an important & topical question!
- Plausible: Fed's deposit rate ceilings caused distortions
- Micro-fact not as tightly linked to macro-phenomenon
- Interesting to quantify how much of stagflation micro fact explains

Smaller issues

- 1973 revision of deposit rate ceilings introduced so-called "wildcard" deposit with 4-year maturity that had no ceiling. Distribution of deposits generally shifted towards longer maturity time deposits after that
- Fin dependence definition inconsistent between Table description and text (tables exclude energy, text includes energy)
- Description of Reg-Q measure could be improved. Earlier surveys have only limited states, but you seem to use anyways only the 1975 survey https://catalog.archives.gov/id/873795
- validation of fin measure
 - Census' Quarterly financial reports (QFR) 2 digit SIC manufacturing sectors
 - Rather than recalculating "financial dependence" in this data: assigne financial dependence to QFR data
 - Virtually no diff in bank debt share, cash ratio etc.